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Abstract 
We propose a method to identify the ranking of focal points (Schelling, 1960) on the individual level. By 
contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects bet on only one alternative, subjects coordinate by 
the distribution of points. This allows them to invest in multiple alternatives and to weigh their choices. 
As a result, subjects not only reveal which alternative appears most focal to them, but the ranking of the 
available alternatives with regard to the degree of focality. In an experiment on the elicitation of social 
norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013), we compare the proposed mechanism with conventional coordination. 
The data confirms the theoretical predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates that the 
proposed technique is suited to identify the heterogeneity of focal points on the individual level. Moreover, 
using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the proposed mechanism identifies focal points on the group 
level significantly more efficiently than ordinary coordination. Finally, we point to the possibility to use 
the mechanism as a simple and direct tool to measure the degree of strategic uncertainty on the individual 
level. 
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1. Introduction 
Shelling (1960) argues that in pure coordination games with multiple equivalent equilibria, subjects 
perceive varying degrees of saliences regarding the available alternatives. This renders some of the 
equilibria more or less “focal”, and thereby constitutes an implicit coordination device. Schelling (1960) 
himself conducted a series of informal experiments to illustrate this effect. For example, he asked subjects 
whether they would pick either “heads” or “tails” in a coordination game. Of the 42 respondents, 36 chose 
heads. As no formal differences between the strategies or the respective equilibria were present in that 
setting, he concluded that the obvious presence of a coordination device could only be attributed to shared 
perceptions and that, apparently, “heads” appeared to be more focal than “tails”. Since then, both 
experimental and theoretical work has corroborated the relevance of focal points in a variety of 
coordination settings (e.g. Binmore and Samuelson, 2006; Casajus, 2000; Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et 
al., 2013, 2014, 2019; Janssen, 2001, 2006; Metha et al. 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Pope et al., 2015; Sudgen, 
1995; Sugden and Zamarrón, 2006). 
 Focal points are interesting not only because they help subjects to coordinate, but because of their 
potential to reveal shared perceptions. For example, in the original version of the Keynesian beauty contest 
(Keynes, 1936), respondents are provided with pictures of women, and their task is to coordinate on the 
most attractive pictures. According to Shelling´s concept, focal points might, for example, be determined 
by shared perceptions about prevalent beauty ideals within the guesser’s population. Capitalizing on this 
very mechanism, Krupka and Weber (2013) propose using coordination games to elicit social norm 
perception. In their approach, subjects are confronted with the description of a particular behavior and 
they then have to coordinate on appropriateness ratings. The assumption that underlies the method is that 
social norms are constituted through shared perceptions (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) which thereby 
determine the focality of alternatives. Consequently, the subjects´ coordination choices will correspond to 
their perception about prevailing social norms. 
 In all the described settings, however, subjects choose only one strategy. As a result, the coordination 
choice of a single participant only reveals which alternative she considers to be most focal. For example, 
a subject´s coordination choice in the above described Keynesian beauty contest reveals which picture she 
considers most focal, but it is not identified which picture is second or third most focal. In order to analyze 
how one alternative relates to other alternatives in terms of focality, and to determine a ranking of 
alternatives regarding their focality, it is necessary to aggregate the choices of many participants. Yet, 
such a ranking would only be visible on the aggregate level, i.e. based on the choices of many participants. 
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Consequently, the ranking refers to the perception of focal points by the whole group of subjects that 
participate in coordination. By contrast, the ranking of focal points on the individual level, i.e. regarding 
a single respondent, remains unidentified. This results from the nature of the technique, since subjects can 
only bet on one alternative. 
 We propose a point beauty contest that allows eliciting the ranking of focal points on the individual 
level. The mechanism represents a coordination setting that allows participants to bet on multiple 
outcomes and to weigh their choices. By contrast to conventional coordination settings, where subjects 
coordinate on only one alternative, subjects are equipped with a budget of points that they can distribute 
between multiple alternatives. Like in ordinary coordination games, subjects are incentivized to reveal 
their beliefs about the other participants´ behavior, as they are paid according to the precision with which 
they anticipate the other participants´ choices. While coordination with a single choice reveals the most 
focal alternative, this approach allows the elicitation of the full ranking of focal points on the level of a 
single participant. 
 We analyze the proposed mechanism both theoretically and experimentally. In the theoretical part, 
we derive predictions for coordination behavior depending on risk preferences and strategic uncertainty. 
In an experiment on the elicitation of social norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013), we compare the proposed 
mechanism with conventional coordination. We find that the coordination outcomes correspond, i.e. 
averaging the individual rankings produced by the proposed method matches the aggregate ranking 
elicited using the conventional approach. Looking at behavior on the subject level confirms the theoretical 
predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates that the proposed technique is suited to 
identify the ranking of focal points on the individual level. Moreover, using Monte Carlo simulations, we 
find that the point beauty contest identifies focal points more efficiently, as it yields a given level of 
precision about the underlying distribution with significantly fewer subjects. Finally, we point to the 
possibility to use the mechanism as a simple and direct tool to measure the degree of strategic uncertainty 
on the individual level. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. The Game 
Consider a one-shot coordination game where subjects 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 see alternatives 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚. Each 
subject receives a budget of 𝑋 points and distributes the points between alternatives. The number of points 
that an individual 𝑖 assigns to 𝑗 is denoted as 𝑥𝑖𝑗. All points must be used, i.e. ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 𝑋. We refer to 
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the vector 𝑋𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑗) as a subject´s coordination choice. After all subjects decided about their 𝑋𝑖, 
the average number of points 𝑥?̅? assigned to alternative 𝑗 is calculated as 𝑥?̅? = (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. The alternative 
that received most points on average is considered the winning alternative 𝑗∗.1 If more than one alternative 
received the maximum number of points, 𝑗∗ is determined randomly among these alternatives.2 Finally, 
each participant receives a payoff 𝜋𝑖 that is proportional to the number of points 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗ that she assigned to 
the winning alternative, i.e. 𝜋𝑖~𝑥𝑖𝑗∗. 
 
2.2. Belief Formation, Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty 
Focal points and belief formation. For each alternative 𝑗, a subject perceives focality 𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 and the 
vector 𝛷𝑖 = (𝜑𝑖1, … , 𝜑𝑖𝑗) determines a subject´s ranking of focalities. A subject´s 𝛷𝑖 is induced by the 
framing of the game, i.e. the question at hand. By definition, subjects assume that perceptions about 
focalities are correlated among participants and that the remaining subjects use it as a coordination device 
(Sudgen, 1995). Based on 𝛷𝑖, a subject derives beliefs 𝑝𝑖𝑗 which reflect the probability that alternative 𝑗 
becomes the winning alternative 𝑗∗. That is, stronger focality of an alternative renders the respective 
alternative as a more promising bet for the investment of points: 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙 for two 
alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙. The vector 𝑃𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖1, … , 𝑝𝑖𝑗), with ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 1, is the probability distribution that 
an individual perceives regarding the coordination outcome. The translation of focalities into actual 
probabilities allows to view the agent´s optimization problem as a game against nature (Luce and Raiffa, 
1957). 
Preferences. Subjects exhibit von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. For convenience, we 
normalize 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗, so that profit will simply equal the number of points assigned to 𝑗
∗. As a result, utility 
simplifies to 𝑈𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝑗). The utility function 𝑢 is continuous and twice differentiable with 
𝑢´(𝑥) > 0. Subjects can be risk averse (𝑢´´(𝑥) < 0), risk neutral (𝑢´´(𝑥) = 0) or risk seeking (𝑢´´(𝑥) >
0). 
Strategic uncertainty and coordination behavior. A subject is certain, if she is sure about the outcome 
of the game: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1 for some 𝑗. A subject is partially uncertain, if she considers at least one alternative 
𝑘 to be more promising than another alternative l, without being fully confident: 0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑙 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘 < 1 for 
                                                 
1 We assume that subjects perceive the coordination outcome to be exogenous, i.e. they do not strategically assign points in 
order to influence the outcome of 𝑗∗. This assumption is adequate when the number of participants is sufficiently large. 
2 It is necessary that only one 𝑗 becomes the winning alternative. This ensures that subjects are not incentivized to equalize 
points among all alternatives which would maximize the profit of all participants, but render the outcome uninformative. 
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some 𝑘 and 𝑙. A subject is fully uncertain, if she is clueless regarding the outcome of the game: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑚 
for all 𝑗. Accordingly, we say that a subject applies gambling, if she assigns all points to one alternative: 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋 for some 𝑗. A subject applies ranking, if she assigns more points to one alternative 𝑘 than to 
another alternative l: 0 < 𝑥𝑖𝑙 < 𝑥𝑖𝑘 < 𝑋. A subject applies hedging, if she fully hedges her profit by 
assigning equally many points to all alternatives: 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋/𝑚 for all 𝑗. 
 
2.3. Predictions for Coordination Behavior and Revelation of Focalities 
For simplicity, predictions refer to a game with two alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙, without loss of generality. Table 
1 shows predictions for coordination behavior depending on risk preference and strategic uncertainty. If 
subjects are either risk-averse or if subjects are certain about the coordination outcome, then a subject´s 
coordination choice 𝑋𝑖 reflects her perception of underlying focalities 𝛷𝑖. That is, subjects apply gambling 
in case of certainty, they apply ranking in case of partial uncertainty and they apply hedging in case of full 
uncertainty. In these cases, subjects reveal their ranking of focal points, as they assign more points to 
alternatives that are considered more promising: 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙. Since we assume that subjects 
derive success probabilities of alternatives based on their degree of focalitity, i.e. 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙, 
a subject´s ranking of points will correspond to her ranking of focalities, i.e. 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙 in 
these cases. Note that this also holds in a game with more than two alternatives. 
Proposition 1. If an individual is risk averse or certain about the coordination outcome, then she fully 
reveals her ranking of focalities by assigning more points to alternatives that are considered more focal. 
Table 1. Predictions for Coordination Behavior 
 
Certainty: 
𝑝𝑘 = 1 
Partial uncertainty: 
0 < 𝑝𝑙 < 𝑝𝑘 < 1 
Full Uncertainty: 
𝑝𝑘 = 𝑝𝑙 
Risk averse 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝟎 < 𝒙𝒍 < 𝒙𝒌 < 𝑿 𝒙𝒌 = 𝒙𝒍 
Risk neutral 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 Indifferent 
Risk seeking 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 or 𝑥𝑙 = 𝑋 
Notes: The bold printing refers to those combinations of risk preference and strategic 
uncertainty, where a subject’s coordination choice fully reflects her beliefs. 
 
3. Experiment 
3.1. Design 
We experimentally tested our predictions by applying the two approaches to the elicitation of social norm 
perception. The approach to use coordination games to measure social norm perception has been proposed 
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by Krupka and Weber (2013). In their approach, subjects are asked to evaluate a particular behavior (e.g. 
“how appropriate is it to do X?”) and different answer alternatives to evaluate that behavior (e.g. “very 
appropriate”, “somewhat appropriate”, “somewhat inappropriate”, “very inappropriate”). The subject´s 
task is to choose the answer of which they think, that it would be chosen by the majority of participants. 
We compared their approach, where subjects can only bet on one alternative, with our proposition, where 
subjects can bet on multiple alternatives and weigh their choices. Note that the elicitation of social norm 
perception is just an arbitrary context to test the proposed mechanism. Any contexts, in which participants 
are asked to coordinate, would have been suited for an experimental test. 
 We conducted two treatments: classical beauty contest (CBC) and point beauty contest (PBC). In both 
treatments, we elicited injunctive social norms (part 1) and descriptive social norms (part 2) for five daily 
life behaviors. Injunctive social norms refer to perceptions of normatively appropriate behavior while 
descriptive social norms refer to perceptions of common behavior, i.e. the behavior practiced by most 
people (Cialdini et al., 1990). Table X shows the five behaviors that we use for the elicitation of injunctive 
and descriptive social norms. 
Table 2. Items Used for the Elicitation of Social Norms 
1. Taking some money out of a found wallet before bringing it to the lost-property office.  
2. Lying for reasons of courtesy.  
3. Treating unfair a person of which one has been treated unfair before.  
4. Keeping the money when the cashier accidentally returned too much change.  
5. Mainly paying attention to the own well-being in daily-life.  
 For the elicitation of injunctive social norms, subjects were confronted with a particular item and they 
were asked, how they evaluate the respective behavior regarding its appropriateness. Subjects could then 
coordinate on the answer options “very appropriate”, “somewhat appropriate”, “somewhat inappropriate”, 
“very inappropriate”. For the elicitation of descriptive social norms, subjects were confronted with a 
particular item and were then asked how many people would act according to the described behavior. 
Subjects could then coordinate on the answer options “a large majority”, “a majority”, “a minority”, “a 
small minority”. 
  In CBC, we employed conventional coordination, as done by Krupka and Weber (2013). That is, for 
each item, a subject received €10 if she managed to pick the answer alternative that was chosen by the 
majority of the respondents in the session (and zero otherwise). In the PBC subjects were endowed with 
100 points in each item and their task was to distribute the 100 points between the available alternatives. 
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In each item, subjects gained 0.10€ for each point that they assigned to the winning alternative, i.e. the 
alternative that has received most points on average. Therefore, the payoff function is symmetric in the 
sense that assigning all 100 points to one alternative in PBC is equivalent to CBC in payoff terms, as it 
yields the same price of €10. 
 In both treatments, subjects received detailed instructions on the coordination mechanisms in part 1 
and 2 and about how their payment would be determined. Specifically, subjects were provided with several 
examples to illustrate how their payment would be calculated depending on their behavior and the 
coordination outcome. Subjects answered several control questions regarding comprehension of profit 
calculation. In particular, we paid attention to make clear that subjects were not asked about their own 
opinion, bur that their task was to coordinate with the remaining participants in the room. In order to make 
sure that subjects consider this feature, we reminded subjects on each screen, on which they had to enter 
a coordination choice, that their task is to coordinate with the other respondents, and not to state their own 
opinion. 
 Finally, (in part 3) we elicited risk preferences using the Eckel and Grossmann (2008) approach, in 
order to test whether risk preferences affect coordination behavior in PBC as predicted by our theory. In 
part 3, subject had to choose one of the following lotteries: 
Table 3. Lotteries Choices Used to Elicit Risk Preferences 
Lottery 50% 50% EV Risk Preference 
1 4.00 4.00 4.00 RA 
2 3.50 5.00 4.25 RA 
3 3.00 6.00 4.50 RA 
4 2.50 7.00 4.75 RA 
5 2.00 8.00 5.00 RA 
6 1.50 9.00 5.25 RA 
7 1.00 10.00 5.50 RA / RN 
8 0.50 10.50 5.50 RN / RS 
Notes: EV = expected value; RA = risk averse; RN = risk neutral; RS = risk seeking. In the 
experiment, subjects only see the first three columns. 
 
 At the end session, one of the three parts was drawn by chance to determine the payment. If part 1 or 
part 2 were drawn, then one item within that part was drawn by chance and it determined the payment of 
a subject. If part 3 was drawn, then subjects actually played the lottery that they chose. 
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3.2. Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in ztree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was done via hroot (Bock 
et al., 2014). In total, 158 subjects participated and the sessions were conducted at the experimental lab of 
Heidelberg University in January and February 2018. We conducted 8 sessions, each with 20 participants 
(except for one session with 18 participants in PBC). 80 subjects participated in the CBC and 78 
participated in the PBC. Participation in either treatment took about 30 minutes and subjects earned on 
average €9.40 (including a including a show-up fee of €5). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Comparison of Coordination Results 
To analyze coordination results, we quantify choices for injunctive norms (descriptive norms) by assigning 
a score of 1 for “very appropriate” (“large majority”), 1/3 for “somewhat inappropriate” (“majority”), -
1/3 for “somewhat inappropriate” (“minority”) and -1 for “very inappropriate” (“small minority”). 
Thereby, the choices are normalized between -1 and 1. Figure 1 shows comparison of mean choices 
between CBC and PBC. Using t-tests to identify differences between treatments, we find that four items 
differ on the 5%-level when no correction for multiple testing is conducted (items 1, 7, 9 and 10). When 
accounting for the inflation of the overall type-I-error rate using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 
1979), differences in two items remain significant (items 9 and 10). 
Figure 1. Comparison of Coordination Results 
 
Notes: Items 1 to 5 are injunctive social norms, items 6-10 are descriptive social norms. 
 
-1,00
-0,50
0,00
0,50
1,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
PBC CBC
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 We next compare ordinal rankings (table 4). That is, in the CBC alternatives are ranked with regard 
to the share of subjects that chose a particular alternative. In the PBC, alternatives are ranked based on 
average point assignments. We do not find that the rankings systematically differ. Precisely, the rankings 
produced by CBC and PBC correspond in eight of the ten items. In two items (4 and 10), we find that the 
rankings do marginally differ, as the order of two of the four alternatives is switched. These differences, 
however, seem to result from noise, as the alternatives that do not correspond are extremely close to one 
another.3 
Table 4. Comparison of Rankings of Alternatives 
 Point Beauty Contest Classical Beauty Contest  
Item + + + - - - Mean + + + - - - Mean 
Ranks 
identical 
1 6 13 29 51 -0,50 1 5 40 54 -0,64 
2 27 42 22 8 0,26 15 73 11 1 0,34  
3 14 32 40 14 -0,02 11 33 53 4 0,01  
4 (19) 28 35 (17) -0,01 (13) 34 40 (14) -0,03 x 
5 22 42 27 9 0,18 25 45 29 1 0,29  
6 13 31 35 21 -0,09 4 36 44 16 -0,15  
7 58 28 10 4 0,60 75 20 4 1 0,79  
8 35 43 16 6 0,38 26 68 5 1 0,46  
9 37 38 18 7 0,37 43 44 13 1 0,52  
10 (39) (41) 14 6 0,42 (51) (46) 3 0 0,66 x 
Notes: Items 1-5 are injunctive social norms, items 6-10 are descriptive social norms. For PBC, the numbers 
represent the average numbers of points that have been assigned to the respective alternatives. For CBC, the 
numbers represent the share (in percent) of subjects that chose the respective alternative. The means are calculated 
according to the above scoring. The numbers in brackets in item 4 and 10 indicate those numbers, where the 
ranking of alternatives is not identical between the two treatments. 
 
Result 1. The coordination outcomes of PBC and CBC correspond on the aggregate level, both regarding 
means and rankings. 
 
                                                 
3 In item 4, for example, in the CBC alternative 1 was chosen by 12.5% and alternative 4 by 13.8%. By contrast, in the PBC, 
alternative 1 received 18.9 points on average and alternative 4 received 17.4 points on average. The two alternatives, however, 
seem to be equally popular in both treatments, and we therefore conclude that the differences regarding their ranking are not 
systematic. 
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4.2. Coordination Behavior and the Role of Risk Preferences in the PBC 
We look at all 780 decisions made in PBC and classify whether subjects apply gambling, ranking or 
hedging. We observe almost no hedging (<0.1%), but some gambling (9.1%). In most of the decisions, 
subjects apply ranking, i.e. they assign varying numbers of points to the available alternatives (90.8%). 
Precisely, in 34.2% subjects fully rank their choices by assigning varying numbers of points to all four 
alternatives. In 53.2% subjects assign three different numbers to the four alternatives and in 3.3% subjects 
assign two different numbers to the four alternatives. 
 Our theoretical framework predicts that subjects “manage” the degree of payoff risk, such that it suits 
their risk preference. We find that the proportion of gambling is driven by participants with low or negative 
risk aversion. While the share of gambling decisions is 22.4% from subjects that chose lottery 7 or lottery 
8, it is only 3.0% from participants that chose lottery 1-6. Moreover, we examine risk induced in 
coordination choice. Table 5 reports regression results on the standard deviation of the assignment of 
points. We find that behavior in the risk elicitastion task is significantly related to the standard deviation 
of the distribution of points. The more risk averse subjects are in the lottery choice, the flatter is the 
distribution of points, i.e. the lower the standard deviation implied in the coordination choice 𝑋𝑖. Also, 
older subjects are more prone to coordinate in a risky manner in the PBC, while a gender effect is observed 
only when not taking into account risk preferences. 
Table 5. Risk Induced in Coordination Choice 𝑋𝑖 
 Standard deviation of points assigned to alternatives 
Lottery 
1.830*** 
(0.480) 
 
1.792*** 
(0.521) 
Female  
-5.384*** 
(2.007) 
-1.953 
(1.985) 
Age  
0.569** 
(0.231) 
0.658*** 
(0.186) 
Economics  
0.179 
(0.460) 
0.420 
(0.429) 
Constant 
18.609*** 
(1.979) 
15.343*** 
(5.728) 
2.484 
(5.780) 
N 780 780 780 
Notes: Tobit regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. The variable “lottery” indicates which of the lotteries (1-8) a subject chose. 
The higher the number, the less risk averse is a subject. Robust standard errors are 
clustered on the individual level and reported in parentheses. 
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Result 2. In the PBC, most of the subjects rank their alternatives to some degree, by assigning different 
numbers to the available alternatives. The more risk averse subjects are, the less dispersed is the 
assignment of points. 
 
5. Simulation 
We run Monte Carlo simulations in order to test which of the techniques uncovers the underlying ranking 
more efficiently (i.e. with fewer observations). We consider the realized coordination outcomes from the 
78 subjects in PBC and the 80 subjects in CBC as benchmark (i.e. the results described in section 4.1.). 
We then run Monte Carlo simulations and mimic our original experiment with varying numbers of n 
participants, with n = 1, …, 100. Each n is simulated 10.000 times both for the CBC and the PBC. We 
then use the simulated data to study how fast the simulated results converge to the benchmark when n 
grows larger. The degree of convergence is measured using convergence of the mean4 and convergence 
of the ordinal ranking of the alternatives. Convergence of the mean is measured as realized confidence 
intervals (50% and 90%) of the simulation means. Convergence of ordinal rankings is measured as the 
share of simulated items, in which the ordinal ranking corresponds to the benchmark. The more efficient 
the mechanism, the faster should confidence intervals for means decline and the faster should the share of 
simulated items rise, in which the ordinal ranking produced by the simulation is identical with the 
benchmark, when n increases. Holding a particular n constant thus allows us to compare the efficiency of 
PBC and CBC. 
 The simulation results show that in the PBC the examined confidence intervals are lower for each n 
in either of the 10 items (figure 2 shows the average of all 10 items, in the appendix the reader finds figures 
of simulations results separately for each item). That is, the precision with which the mean is approached 
when the number of participants increases is higher for the PBC for each size of n. Regarding convergence 
to the ordinal rankings, the PBC converges faster to the underlying ranking in 9 of the 10 items, while in 
one item the CBC converges faster. 
 The efficiency gains are particularly strong for ordinary numbers of participants used in economic 
experiments. For example, both the 90%-confidence and the 50%-confidence intervals for the mean that 
are realized in the CBC with n=50 participants are reached in the PBC with n=30 participants already. 
The share of ordinal rankings that corresponds to the benchmark that are produced in the CBC with n=50 
                                                 
4 To derive the mean we use the same scoring system as in the results section. That is, the ratings are normalized between -1 
and 1. 
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is reached in the PBC already with n=16. This indicates that the PBC is more efficient as an experimental 
method, in particular regarding the elicitation of ordinal rankings of focal points. 
 
Figure 2. Simulation Results 
Panel A. Convergence to the mean Panel B. Convergence to ordinal ranking 
 
 
Notes: The x-axis of both graphs indicates the n, i.e. the number of participants with which the simulation is 
conducted. The left figure shows confidence intervals of means. The right figure shows the share of simulation 
runs in which the ordinal ranking of a simulation run corresponds with the ranking of the benchmark. Both figures 
contain the data of 100.000 simulation runs (10.000 simulation runs for each of the ten items). 
 
Result 3. The PBC is significantly more efficient than the CBC in identifying the means and the ordinal 
rankings of coordination choices on the group level. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We propose a point beauty contest to identify the ranking of focal points in coordination games on the 
individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination where subjects can only bet on one choice, 
subjects are endowed with points, which they assign to the available alternatives. This enables the subjects 
to bet on multiple outcome and to weigh their choices. We examine the proposed method both theoretically 
and experimentally, and find that it is suited to identify the heterogeneity of focal points on the individual 
level, as most of the subjects assign varying numbers of points to the different alternatives. Moreover, 
using Monte Carlo simulations, we find the mechanism to be more efficient regarding the identification 
of focal points on the group level. 
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 We see several fields of application for the proposed method. First, the mechanism is useful when an 
experimenter is interested to study more precisely the heterogeneity of beliefs in coordination games. 
Second, the mechanism might be useful when an experimenter is interested in the identification of focal 
points on the group level, but when the number of participants is limited. As shown in the section 5, the 
point beauty contest yields results that are as precise as the results from ordinary coordination with 
substantially fewer subjects. Third, the point beauty contest might serve as a simple and direct tool to 
measure strategic uncertainty in coordination games, as the assignment of points depends on the risk 
preferences and the degree of strategic uncertainty that the subjects perceives. Controlling for risk 
preferences would thus allow to isolate the degree of strategic uncertainty on the individual level. For 
example, Heinemann et al. (2009) propose to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty 
equivalents and identify the payment that renders a subject indifferent between the certain payoff and an 
uncertain payoff that is subject to strategic uncertainty. Our approach would facilitate the elicitation of 
uncertainty in strategic settings, as the assignment of points in the point beauty contest yields a measure 
that is directly related to that kind of uncertainty, and it can easily be isolated when controlling for risk 
preferences. 
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